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The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was one of 
the most accurately and generally predicted of major economic events.’ Hind- 
sight, of  course,  sharpens the perception of  the inevitability of  events and 
makes great prophets of  those members of the spectrum of analysts who hap- 
pened to get their predictions right. But the general outlines at least of the key 
events from 1967 through 1971 were foreseen, starting from the work of Trif- 
fin  (1960),  whose  warnings provided  the compass to policymakers imple- 
menting serious changes in the provision of liquidity and the administration 
of capital controls in a vain attempt to preserve the system. 
The heyday of Bretton Woods, during which the system actually operated 
as envisioned under full convertibility, lasted only from 1959 through 1968. 
Associated with steady growth in world production and trade, these nine years 
and  the preceding decade of  movement toward  currency convertibility are 
considered something of a golden age in contrast to the six-year debacle of the 
interwar gold standard. Yet, from the moment of full convertibility on current 
account transactions in  1959, the steady growth of official and private liquid 
dollar claims in the hands of foreigners and the reduction in official gold hold- 
ings, and especially U.S.  gold holdings, convinced policymakers that, barring 
some alteration, the system was on a trajectory headed toward collapse.2 
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1. For example, Triffin (1960) warned of the potential for the collapse of the system, and Rueff 
stated, “What I am sure of  is that, if  we remain in the same regime, we shall some day anive at 
the end of the means of  external payments by the United States. This will mean that, whether they 
want or not, whatever the agreement in the IMF and the GATT, they will have to establish an 
embargo on gold, establish quotas on import, impose restrictions such as the one they are now 
studying on foreign travel, and cut the links between nations” (Rueff and Hirsch 1965, 14). 
2. Why the cumulation of foreign liquid dollar claims was a problem is not clear. Of course, if 
U.S. gold holdings far exceeded foreign liquid dollar claims, either in private or in official hands, 
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Starting from 1960, efforts to patch perceived deficiencies in the operation 
of the system assumed the form of perfecting interventions in the private gold 
market through the organization of the Gold Pool and the establishment of 
various formal liquidity-increasing techniques-the  General Arrangements to 
Borrow (GAB), currency swaps among central banks, and special drawing 
rights (SDRs). Essentially, these were new forms of lines of credit jerry-built 
atop the preexisting credit lines like intergovernmental and private bank loans 
and drawings under the IMF’s original credit provisions. Analogous to inter- 
bank credit lines in a domestic banking system, such changes would have 
tended to reduce official demand for foreign reserves. If, as claimed by  the 
United States, U.S. balance-of-payments deficits were the result of increases 
in the demand for liquid foreign exchange reserves because of underdeveloped 
European capital markets (see Solomon 1982, 53-54),  these changes, in re- 
ducing reserve demand, would have alleviated the U. S . balance-of-payments 
deficit, although they would have raised the price level and threatened the 
dollar convertibility of  gold.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  U.S.  balance-of- 
payments deficits were brought about by excessive U.S. monetary expansion, 
as claimed by various European governments, these devices would have ac- 
celerated the crisis by reducing the demand for liquid dollar claims in the face 
of a monetary e~pansion.~ 
The formation of the Gold Pool led generally to official gold sales by  per- 
mitting an internal drain on gold and terminated in the speculative run on gold 
in 1968. As a temporary fix, the private market for gold was separated from 
the official market with the establishment of  a floating private market price 
and a restriction that official holders of  gold would transact only with each 
other. Finally, foreign central banks, spurred on by  selling attacks on their 
currencies, participated in a final attack on gold, forcing an end of access to 
the U.S. gold window and generating a round of revaluations against the dol- 
foreigners could not successfully directly run U.S. gold reserves if  the entire amount of  U.S. 
reserves was made available to defend the parity.  As  liquid claims accumulated sufficiently to 
exceed U.S. gold reserves, such a direct run was feasible. Nevertheless, the gulf between feasibil- 
ity and profitability can be.  vast. 
More generally, although foreigners may have lacked sufficient liquid claims on the dollar to 
have staged a run, U.S. domestic residents had claims that far exceeded U.S. gold reserves. Al- 
though gold ownership by U.S. citizens was illegal, such claims could have been shifted abroad 
and quickly used to run the system.  These claims were ignored in the discussions at the time 
(except perhaps in the budding monetary approaches such as that of Mundell [1971]). Perhaps it 
was thought that the bulk of  the claims in the United States were retail claims unlikely to be 
mobilized in  a speculative attack while the official and private foreign claims were wholesale. 
Nevertheless, the wholesale U.S.  money markets were the largest and the least restricted in the 
world. Alternatively, perhaps it was thought that controls could readily be placed on U.S. holders 
of liquid claims to prevent them from joining a speculative attack. The same, however, could be 
said for private foreign claimants, who controlled the bulk of the foreign claims. Foreign official 
claimants would have had to be treated more gingerly by U.S. authorities. 
3. This identification problem about the causes of the European accumulation of liquid dollar 
claims framed much of the political dimension of the monetary debate of the 1960s. 463  The Collapse of  the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 
lar. The last attempt to preserve the fixed exchange rate system through the 
Smithsonian Agreement was launched in December 197  1. In little more than 
a year, however, further speculative attacks were launched on the dollar, lead- 
ing to the final collapse of  the system in  1973 and the shift to a managed 
floating regime. Thus, the dollar standard period from 1968 to 1973 can be 
characterized as a period of recurrent devaluation. 
Interwoven with the dollar/gold trajectory of  the system, other countries 
had episodes of  foreign exchange crisis during the 1960s. The most notable 
of these was the pound sterling crisis from 1964 to 1967, which culminated in 
the devaluation of  1967. Since the pound was the second most important of 
the reserve currencies, this devaluation contributed to the pressure on the dol- 
lar that led to the abandonment of the gold leg of the system in 1968. Tangen- 
tially, internal political difficulties in France in 1968 caused the devaluation of 
the franc. Finally, reflecting the growing pressure on the system, the deutsche 
mark was revalued in 1969 and floated in May  1971 prior to the closing of the 
U.S. gold window, in response to selling attacks on the deutsche mark. 
The collapse of Bretton Woods encompasses the events involved in the se- 
quential withdrawal of convertibility of gold into dollars, thereby ending the 
role of gold as a liquid dollar claim, and the end of the unified fixed exchange 
rate regime from 1968 through 1973. The Bretton Woods institutions them- 
selves, notably the International Monetary Fund, which had been the institu- 
tion overseeing the maintenance of  convertibility of gold into the dollar and 
fixed exchange rates, continued their existence and their forms of operation. 
The IMF still had the role of providing liquidity, but now generally to those 
countries that fixed to major currencies rather than to the countries supplying 
the major currencies. In  addition, other important features of  the Bretton 
Woods Agreement-free  convertibility of  currencies in current transactions, 
the dollar as a central payment and reserve medium, and the ability to adjust 
payment imbalances (in a managed float) without deflationary measures (i.e., 
those features most sought by Keynes in the wartime negotiations)-contin- 
ued generally unabated. 
Since it is one of the best-studied events in international finance, there are 
numerous impressive descriptions and analyses of the end of Bretton Woods, 
starting from before the collapse itself. These analyses span many points of 
view-the  informed insider policymaker like Solomon (1982), the practi- 
tionedacademic in  applied international finance like Triffin  (1960,  1966b, 
1968, 1978), the institutional historian like de Vries (1976), the academic 
theorist like Mundell (1971), and the legal-institutional analyst like Dam 
(1982). 
In these pages, I will review the principal events and institutional changes 
that preceded the collapse and present the salient arguments for the causes of 
the collapse, documenting the progression of events with some data charts. I 
will use a graphic presentation of results from the theory of speculative attacks 
on fixed exchange rates that have emerged in the past decade to serve as a 464  Peter M. Garber 
descriptive aid in explaining the various points of view among policymakers 
in  the debates of  the  1960s. The events of  the collapse can be  silhouetted 
against the background of the mechanical speculative attack models in which 
the exchange regime is secondary in importance and in which the authorities 
simply use the fixed exchange rate mechanism as a source of  finance (see 
Mundell 1971). The issue then is either how far the authority will go in dissi- 
pating its foreign exchange reserves before letting go or, alternatively, how 
long it will receive foreign credit through the cumulation of  claims in the 
hands of a foreign authority. 
9.1  Stepping-stones  toward Collapse 
In table 9.1, I have listed the principal events and institutional changes lead- 
ing to the final collapse. The list can be split into several categories. One 
contains those institutional changes aimed at providing additional liquidity 
either through credit lines like swaps and the GAB or through the creation of 
the SDRs, a quasi-credit, quasi-reserve settlement medium. A second cate- 
gory concerns the sequence of events that led to the end of gold convertibil- 
ity-that  is, the termination of gold’s usefulness as a liquid dollar claim. The 
third category encompasses the events that fractured the system of fixed pari- 
ties. In this section, I will concentrate exclusively on the latter two categories. 
9.1.1 
Figure 9.1 depicts the private market dollar price of  gold in London from 
1960 through 1976. The flat line segment through 1968 represents the period 
of  operation of  the Gold Pool,  a consortium of  central banks organized in 
1961 to undertake purchases and sales of gold in London to peg the market at 
the official price.4 The United States was to provide 50  percent of  the gold, 
with the remainder coming from seven European central banks. As indicated 
in the figure, the Gold Pool was successful until March 1968, when it ceased 
operations after selling $3 billion of gold since the previous November, with 
$400 million of  gold sold on  14 March alone. Of  this amount, the United 
States expended $2.2 billion in gold, and both the U.S.  and the U.K. gold 
stocks declined by  18 percent between September 1967 and March 1968. At 
this point, the members of  the Pool agreed to a two-tiered system for gold- 
the central banks would buy and sell gold to each other at the official price but 
would refrain from buying or selling in the private market. The private market 
price then floated upward, reaching as high as $42.00 per ounce, but gold 
sales by South Africa brought the price back to about $35.00  per ounce by the 
end of 1969. Thus, the attack on gold did not result in a great discontinuity in 
the price of gold while seriously depleting the monetary gold stock. 
The Trouble with the Gold Dollar 
4. For the discussion of the Gold Pool, I lean on Dam (1982, 138-39)  and Solomon (1982, 
114-19). 465  The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 



































Fourteen European countries start convertibility of their currencies for current 
account transactions 
The Triffin plan proposed 
Bade Agreement among central banks to hold each other’s currency and to lend 
Establishment of  the London Gold Pool. 
to each other 
Start of persistent French gold purchases from the United States 
Beginning of the swap facilities to provide reciprocal lines of  credit among cen- 
Beginning of  the GAB 
tral banks 
Start of technical studies and discussions that would lead to the establishment of 
the SDR 
President de Gaulle and d’Estaing propose a return to the gold standard 
End of persistent French gold purchases from the United States 
The United Kingdom devalues the pound sterling from $2.80 to $2.40 
Gold Pool interventions end; the two-tiered market for gold begins 
SDR amendments are sent to IMF members for approval 
Exchange pressure on the French franc because of internal political crisis 
Exchange crisis closes markets in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
SDR amendments are in force 
The  French franc is devalued from .18 grams of gold per franc to .16 grams 
The deutsche mark floats 
The deutsche mark is revalued from $0.25 to $0.273 
First SDR allocation 
Second SDR allocation 
The deutsche mark and the Dutch guilder float 
The United States suspends convertibility of the dollar into gold for official trans- 
actions, suspends the use of swaps, and imposes price controls and a 10 per- 
cent import surcharge; all countries with major currencies except France start 
to float, impose exchange controls, and undertake major interventions to buy 
dollars 
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Table 9.1  (continued) 
Dec .  In the Smithsonian Agreement, the G10 realign currency exchange rates in a re- 
vised fixed rate system; the United States agrees to devalue the dollar to 
$38.00 per ounce of gold; average devaluation of the dollar against other cur- 
rencies is 10 percent; dollar convertibility into gold by the United States was 
not restored, and the U.S. made no commitment to support the dollar 
I972 




The dollar devalued to $42.22  per ounce of gold; all major currencies therefore 
After massive interventions by foreign exchange authorities, the system of fixed 
revalued against the gold dollar by  ten percent 
exchange rates collapsed into generalized floating 
Sources: de Vries (1976, xviii-xxii,  190-205);  Pauls (1990, 891-98). 
Fig. 9.1  Private market price of gold in dollars (London), 1960-75 
The run on gold resulted from speculation about a possible devaluation of 
the dollar. This was  natural in the light of  the steady decline in  U.S. gold 
reserves, driven by  conversions of  dollars to gold by the French starting in 
1962 and culminating in 1966. In March 1961, the world and U.S. monetary 
gold stocks were $40.6 and $17.4 billion, respectively. By the end of Decem- 
ber 1967, these amounts had reached $41.6 and $12 billion, respectively, and 
the U.S. gold stock fell to a low point of  $10.7 billion at the end of  March 
1968 (see Board of Governors 1976, 918). When the French gold-purchasing 
program began in the first quarter of  1962, the U.S. gold stock was  $16.8 
billion. Of  the $3.3 billion decline through the third quarter of  1966, $2.8 467  The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 
billion was purchased directly by France, almost exactly the amount by which 
the French gold stock increased. In the same period, German gold holdings 
increased by  $600 million, exactly balancing the decline in  the U.K. gold 
stock, but there were no other major acquisitions  of gold by other countries. 
These drains drove the United States almost to the limit of  its willingness 
to intervene in  the  gold  markets. Political problems broke out  in France 
shortly after the advent of the two-tiered system, and this provided the oppor- 
tunity for the United States to buy almost $1 billion of French gold during the 
next year. To  this extent, gold in the hands of central banks still served as a 
liquid dollar claim. In the final attacks in 1971, this was  about all that the 
United States was willing to sell back to foreign central banks before it aban- 
doned ~onvertibility.~ 
9.1.2  The Trouble with the Dollar 
The period through the advent of  the two-tiered gold system was one of 
slowly increasing short-term dollar liabilities held by foreigners and of  de- 
creasing U. S  . gold stocks, as predicted by Triffin (  1960). Figure 9.2 indicates 
that liquid dollar liabilities in  the hands of  foreign official institutions ex- 
ceeded the U.S. gold stock in the latter half of the 1960s. Figure 9.3 depicts 
the short-term dollar claims, both official and private bank claims, held abroad 
in comparison to the U.S. gold stock. These claims were relatively flat until 
the advent of the two-tiered system. The exception is the United Kingdom in 
the three-year period leading to the devaluation of the pound sterling in 1967. 
After the start of the two-tiered system, claimants in the major countries be- 
gan to accumulate short-term dollar claims. Figure 9.4 indicates that these 
liquid dollar claims were  mainly acquired by  foreign banks  since official 
claims did not rise, with the exception of Japan in 1968. 
These increases were not the result of  funding for U.S. current account 
operations. Figure 9.5 shows that the U.S. current account did not register a 
deficit until  1971. This is remarkable given that the United States was  seri- 
ously engaged in a war from 1965 through 1972 with the peak years of mili- 
tary operations from 1967 to 69. 
In figures 9.3 and 9.4, short-term dollar claims began to leap upward dra- 
matically in mid-1970, and these are almost entirely additions to official re- 
serves. Until the end of official gold conversions by the United States in Au- 
gust  1971, there was  a continuous and  massive selling attack on  foreign 
currencies. Figure 9.6 indicates the extent of  official foreign intervention in 
support of the exchange rates. The interventions in the third quarter of  1971 
and the first quarter of  1973 indicate massive speculative attacks on foreign 
central banks. Germany floated the deutsche mark twice-in  October 1969 
after an upsurge in official dollar purchases followed by a 10 percent revalua- 
5. The United States has sat on a monetary gold stock of about $1 1 billion (now  evaluated at 
$42.22) ever since. 468  Peter M. Garber 
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Fig. 9.2  Total official liabilities and gold holdings, quarterly, 1964-75 
Source: IMF,  International Financial Statistics 
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tion and in May  197  1. The realignments under the Smithsonian Agreements 
did not end  the selling attacks-the  massive acquisitions of  official dollar 
claims did not cease until generalized floating began in March 1973. Figure 
9.7 indicates the extent of the realignments of  the various currencies. 
In figures 9.8 and 9.9, I include data on some monetary conditions in the 
United States that drove these events. The charts indicate secularly increasing 
growth rates that are consistent across the various measures of the money sup- 
ply,  at least through 1974. They also indicate an accelerating U.S. inflation 
paralleled by inflation rates in the other countries. 
9.1.3  The Bank Analogy 
Policy efforts and criticisms of  U.S.  policy during the  1960s centered on 
the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit, defined as official U.S. gold sales plus 
foreign accumulations of liquid dollar claims on the United States. Sensitive 
to the criticisms of the persistent deficits run up under this definition and to 
the Triffin argument that large accumulations of  liquid dollar claims abroad 
ultimately threatened the system, U.S. policymakers imposed a sequence of 
current account and especially capital account controls to stem the increase in 
short-term liabilities.6 
Notwithstanding the concentration on and the criticism of U.S. balance-of- 
payments  deficits,  other  voices  argued  that  the  cumulation of  short-term 
6. These included higher taxes on U.S. corporate earnings abroad and capital controls such as 
an interest equalization tax on foreign borrowing in the United States, an interest equalization tax 
on long-term U.S. bank loans to foreigners, a limitation of U.S. funding of US.  banks’ foreign 
operations, and a limitation of funding by U.S. corporations of direct investment abroad. 469  The Collapse of  the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 
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Fig. 9.3  Total official and private liquid dollar claims vs. U.S. gold stock by 
country, quarterly, 1964-75 
Note; U.S.  liabilities are short-term liabilities to governments and banks 
claims signaled no problem in need of correction, at least in the form of capi- 
tal controls.' Since the United States consistently booked current account sur- 
pluses until  1971, the balance-of-payments deficits entirely indicated the re- 
packaging  of  assets  that  is  the  business  of  any  financial  intermediary. 
Balancing the increases in short-term dollar claims against the United States 
were increases in long-term, less liquid dollar- or foreign-denominated assets 
as well as short-term U.S. claims on foreigners. Effectively, the United States, 
taken as a whole, was operating as a bank to foreigners, providing liquid dol- 
7. For the bank analogy, see, e.g., Kindleberger  (1965). For a rebuttal, see Triffin (1966a). 470  Peter M. Garber 
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Fig. 9.4  Official reserve composition by country foreign exchange reserves, 
gold reserves, total reserves 
lar liabilities against less liquid assets. Until 1968, it offered general convert- 
ibility of its liabilities through a gold reserve and through the interventions of 
the Gold Pool. Therefore,  gold also could be held as an additional dollar 
claim. Afterward, it offered official convertibility of gold into dollars to the 
other central banks, so both before and after 1968 the United States was the 
world's central bank. 
9.1.4 
The French  criticism of  the Bretton  Woods  system was that  it  gave the 
United States a great advantage as a central bank and did not force any correc- 
tive measures when foreigners acquired its liquid liabilities or gold (see Rueff 
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Fig. 9.5  U.S. current account and merchandise trade balance 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Fig. 9.6  Changes in U.S. official reserves (net): Gold sales + foreign exchange 
sales + increases in foreign official liabilities 
and Hirsch 1965, 2-3;  and Solomon 1982, 55). As a result, foreign assets 
were being bought cheaply. 
The dollar was and still is the most liquid currency.*  It encompassed a huge 
market and consisted of extensive, liquid money and financial markets ser- 
8. A liquid payments system is one in which a large number of transactions can be settled with 
only a small transfer of good funds. Thus,  a good measure of liquidity is the ratio of payments 
transactions to interbank reserve borrowings.  For example, in the domestic market, this would 
currently be the ratio of  domestic payments to Feds funds purchased, a ratio that is quite high 
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Fig. 9.7  Exchange rates: Dollar vs. various currencies 
viced by  a central bank rooted in the obligation to provide liquidity to the 
financial system in the British tradition. Other major countries, notably Ger- 
many and Japan, severely restricted their money markets to force wide spreads 
on their protected banking systems. This made their banks uncompetitive in 
the provision of wholesale liquidity to international markets and added to the 
advantages that the dollar possessed as the international unit since its liquidity 
was more lightly taxed. Of course, other countries could have competed in 
fostering their currencies as the world's payment medium, but they apparently 
preferred to aid local financial monopolies and to maintain financial control 
by taxing liquidity in their currencies. 473  The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 
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Fig. 9.8  U.S. monetary stock growth rates 
9.1.5  The Cost to Foreigners of Holding Liquid Dollar Claims 
There need be no inherent problem with a fiat monetary system with one 
country’s central bank providing the liquid funds. Through the Federal Re- 
serve or other instrumentalities, the United States provided liquidity through 
a thick grid of lines of credit to other central banks. The dollar reserves held 
by the foreign monetary authorities as the ultimate source of liquidity were 
primarily bank liabilities and money market instruments earning a competitive 
rate. Foreign central banks therefore did not lose seigniorage on these funds 
or pay an inflation tax (as in Mundell 1971, chap. 16). Rather, they gave up 
seigniorage to the United States only to the extent of the same liquidity pre- 
mium that the price of  all money market  instruments and deposits in  the 474  Peter M. Garber 
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Fig. 9.9  Consumer inflation rates in various countries, quarterly, 1964-75 
Source: For the United States, data are from the consumer price index. For all other countries, 
data are from the IMF.  International Financial Statistics. 
United States bore-that  is, the prorated cost of the zero-interest-bearing re- 
serve deposits held at the Federal Reserve by the U.S. banking system. 
In  an  inflationary environment, however, the  associated rise  in  the Fed 
funds rate raises the cost of liquidity if the U.S. banking system cannot pro- 
portionally reduce its reserve holdings because the cost to the banking system 
of reserve holdings rises. In this case, the spread between liquid and illiquid 
securities rises, and holding liquid dollar securities is more costly in terms of 
yield forgone. Since dollar liquidity is more costly, U.S. holders and official 
and private foreign holders of liquid dollar securities will reduce their real 
holdings by switching to less liquid alternatives, 
The fixed rate Bretton Woods system was designed to make all currencies 475  The Collapse of  the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 
liquid in terms of the dollar as the unit of  account. To  provide this liquidity, 
local central banks guaranteed the market price of their currencies in the de 
facto world unit of  account at par by  making the market in dollars at fixed 
rates. Providing such liquidity required liquid dollar funds or credit lines, so 
the United States was automatically the source of liquidity to the other central 
banks. Although gold was officially the ultimate settlement mechanism for the 
United States, dollars were the ultimate settlement medium for the rest of the 
world; but the official status of gold made it also useful to other countries as a 
liquid claim. The inflation of the dollar led to the abandonment of the fixed 
exchange rate system, as foreign central banks found that they were taking 
excessive dollar positions in providing their liquidity services, but not to the 
abandonment of the dollar as the ultimate unit of account and source of world 
liquidity. 
9.2  A Graphic Interpretation of the Issues of the Debate 
In this section, I will graphically depict the conceptual system that framed 
the discussions about the progress of the Bretton Woods system toward col- 
lapse.9 
The stages in the disintegration of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system 
can be described graphically as in figure 9.10. The vertical axis is the price of 
gold in terms of a basket of goods. P, is $35.00 per ounce, and P is the price 
level. The total world stock in ounces of gold is represented by the length of 
the horizontal axis from 0  to B. 
The private demand for gold is negatively related to the relative price of 
gold. The curve labeled D  is the demand for gold used for industrial purposes. 
At first, I will assume that the demand for gold is static; I will change this 
later to an assumption that the private demand for gold grows with real in- 
come. If the relative price of gold is expected to grow less rapidly than the 
real interest rate, speculative hoards of gold will not be held. 
Alternatively, gold can be held as a liquid dollar claim, generally by gov- 
ernments. The interpretations of  the events leading up to the  1968 collapse 
rest on a presumption that there was a well-defined world demand for real 
liquid dollar-denominated claims (the sum of monetary gold, short-term bank 
liabilities, Treasury bills, etc.  -items  convertible instantly into good funds) 
that depended positively on the level of  world real economic activity. In a 
fixed exchange rate system with gold and other currencies convertible into the 
dollar, gold and other liquid dollar claims satisfied this demand.lO In Decem- 
ber 1965, the world monetary gold reserve-that  is, the official stock readily 
9. The model that I use is a graphic version of  a gold standard model in Barsky and Summers 
10. Liquid claims in other currencies like sterling also satisfied part of  this demand, but I will 
(1988). Similar models can be found in Flood and Garber (1984) and in Bm  (1979). 
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Fig. 9.10  Equilibrium price level in a dollar standard with gold convertibility 
convertible to dollars-was  about 1.23 billion ounces; this fell to 1.15 billion 
ounces by March 1968 after the run on the Gold Pool. 
Equilibrium pairs of  the gold value of  world liquid dollar claims and the 
relative price of  gold are depicted by  the curve labeled LII1  where L is the 
nominal value of  liquid dollar claims."  For this curve, the origin is labeled 
0'.  On the horizontal axis to the left of the origin 0'  to B, I plot the gold value 
of liquid dollar claims LIP,. The demand for real liquid claims depends posi- 
tively on real world income, but for now  I will assume that real income is 
fixed. The demand for real liquid claims is then constant so that the product 
LIP  = LIP,  X  P,IP remains unchanged, a relation depicted by the hyperbola 
in the figure. Any point on the hyperbola represents the same ratio of nominal 
liquid dollar claims to the price level. The dashed line hyperbola represents 
the real value of foreign liquid dollar claims and monetary gold, which total 
O'C in the diagram. The split of foreign demand between monetary gold and 
liquid dollar claims is indeterminate in this model. 
The equilibrium world price level P* is such that the relative price P,/P* 
clears the gold market-the  total stock of  gold is then equal to the amount 
demanded for industrial purposes OA and the amount used for monetary re- 
11. I have assumed that gold- and dollar-denominated liquid claims are perfect substitutes in 
satisfying the demand for dollar liquidity. If there is confidence in the system, however, dollar 
claims will be preferred because they bear a market interest rate while gold does not. That gold is 
held indicates a belief that there may be a capital gain from gold. 477  The Collapse of  the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 
serves AB. At the price level P*, the gold value of world liquid dollar securi- 
ties supply plus world monetary gold AB  satisfies the world demand for liquid 
dollar claims. 
9.2.1  Expanding Demand for Reserves 
Suppose now that world real income increases. This will shift the position 
of  the parabola representing demand for liquid claims outward, as in figure 
9.11 to the curve labeled [UP]'.  In the absence of an increase in the supply of 
world liquid dollar claims, the new equilibrium price level will be lower at 
P**, raising the relative price of  gold to P,/P** and driving additional gold 
into monetary reserves to meet the demand. Since deflation has been  ana- 
thema since the 1930s, a policy precluding the creation of additional liquid 
dollar claims was not acceptable. The problem of how to prevent deflation in 
the face of increased demands for liquid dollar claims was labeled the liquidity 
problem. 
As one solution to the liquidity problem, the United States could expand 
short-term dollar claims, part of  which would be acquired either by  foreign 
central banks or by  other foreign claimants, assuming that part of the shift in 
demand comes from foreign income growth. This would increase the total of 
foreign liquid claims against the United States and require the United States 
to sustain a deficit on its balance of  payments. In the context of  the early 
1960s, with the United States in surplus on current account, a deficit on the 
balance of  payments required the United States to accumulate longer-term 
claims against foreigners,  financed partly by  the acquisition of  short-term 
claims against the United States by foreign exchange authorities or other for- 
eign entities. In figure 9.12, expansion of  liquid dollar claims would move 
rightward the origin 0' for the demand curve for liquid dollar claims to 0".  A 
sufficient increase in liquid dollar claims would then maintain a stable price 
level at the original P* when there is an increase in demand for liquid claims. 
If  this process continues, the ratio of  monetary gold to liquid dollar claims 
and to foreign holdings of dollar exchange will constantly decline. Neverthe- 
less, as long as there is confidence in the stability of the price level, there is 
no reason to attack the system. 
In  this  context,  the  United  States  contended that  it  had  a  balance-of- 
payments deficit because foreigners demanded liquid dollar claims rather than 
because of mismanaged macroeconomic policy or some fundamental disequi- 
librium in exchange rates.  If  the United States took steps to eliminate the 
deficit, it would generate deflation. 
12. For an exposition of this result in a dynamic context, see Flood and Garber (1984). Any 
reserve ratio is consistent with the preservation of the system. Indeed, the ratio can monotonically 
decline toward zero without a collapse as long as the monetary expansion is consistent with a 
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9.2.2  The Addition of Further Dollar Claims: SDRs 
The addition of an internationally acceptable reserve unit fixed to the gold 
value of the dollar, the SDR, is essentially an increase in liquid dollar claims 
and would cause movements in 0' like those described in figure 9.12. Ideally, 
the amount of  SDRs would have increased to meet the foreign demand for 
liquid dollar claims and would have obviated the need for the United States to 
operate with the payments deficits required to supply foreign demands. Alter- 
natively, the SDR supply might have been in addition to the supply of liquid 
dollar claims and would have exacerbated the inflationary tendency inherent 
in the system.  l3 
9.2.3  A Collapse of Gold Convertibility 
Two different stories can explain the collapse of the system of gold convert- 
ibility with the dollar. First, in the context of figure 9.12, gold convertibility 
will eventually end in the presence of liquid dollar claim expansions beyond 
the amounts required to match increases in the demand for liquid claims with 
price level stability. In figure 9.12, such expansions are depicted as rightward 
movements in the origin 0'.  For a while, such movements increase the price 
level, although gold convertibility can be maintained. At some point, official 
gold reserves  are exhausted, and  the  convertibility between  liquid dollar 
claims and gold must be abandoned. Gold then ceases to serve as a form of 
liquid dollar claim. In figure 9.13, I have represented this event by the curves 
through the point E where all gold is held in private uses. Of course, official 
intervention may end earlier at some positive level of official gold reserves. 
The dynamics of  events at the time of  the end of  a fixed exchange rate 
regime have been studied in a series of papers starting with Krugman (1979). 
Flood and Garber (1984) studied the dynamics of the collapse of a gold stan- 
dard struck with a sudden internal drain. In the context of this literature, figure 
9.13 must be  altered somewhat to assure continuity of  prices and eliminate 
unusual expected speculative  profits at the time of the collapse. 
In figure 9.14, I depict a situation in which a marginal increment in liquid 
dollar claims (the movement of the origin from 0' to 0")  collapses the gold 
standard through a simultaneous downward shift in demand for liquid claims 
and upward shift in the demand for private gold. The guiding principle of the 
speculative attack literature is that the shifts in these demands will be timed 
correctly and be of the correct magnitude to preclude a foreseeable relative 
price jump in gold and a price level discontinuity. 
What drives these shifts? In the case of the private demand for gold, specu- 
lators may bet on a future devaluation of gold after a period of floating, with 
13. Of course, by the time the  SDR was implemented with the first  allocation in  1970, the 
connection between the official and the private gold markets had been severed. Nevertheless, if 
the extensive discussion about the  creation of  an SDR signaled a future increase in the rate of 
creation of liquid claims reserves, it may have advanced the date of a speculative attack on mone- 
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gold eventually convertible to dollars once again. Suddenly, then, they expect 
the real price of  gold to shift from a depreciation to a steady appreciation, 
making it profitable for them to hoard gold. As in Obstfeld (1984), this shift 
in return will cause speculators to run the gold in official reserves.I4 
The shift downward in  demand for liquid claims is more problematic. In 
standard speculative attack models, the analogue of this demand is a demand 
for a currency paying zero interest. A collapse of a scheme to fix the foreign 
currency value of the currency in the presence of steady increases in the cur- 
rency suddenly shifts up the expected inflation rate and the nominal interest 
rate and discontinuously shifts down the demand for real currency. Currency 
is the most liquid claim in these models, so the public accepts a zero interest 
rate to use it. When the yields on less liquid claims rise because of the jump 
in  inflation, however, demand shifts away from the more liquid to the less 
liquid claims. Alternatively stated, the spread between liquid and less liquid 
claims increases. In the present case, liquid dollar claims are wholesale liquid 
bank deposits or short-term securities whose market yields also jump up with 
nominal interest rates. Nevertheless, the shift down in real demand for liquid 
dollar claims emerges from the same upward shift in the spread between liquid 
and illiquid assets that will occur when the inflation rate shifts upward after 
the collapse.I5  The increased spread reduces the demand for liquidity. 
The second force that can cause a collapse of convertibility of gold into the 
dollar has nothing to do with monetary mismanagement. Rather, it is the po- 
tential for a continuing imbalance between growing private demand for gold 
and new gold supplies generally classified as “the vagaries of the gold stan- 
dard.” Suppose now that the private demand for gold depends positively on 
the level of income. In figure 9.1  1, an increase in income will now shift both 
curves upward and be even more deflationary. A policy to increase liquid dol- 
lar claims to prevent deflation-that  is, to fix the relative price of gold-will 
now require an even larger expansion than that in figure 9.12. Nevertheless, 
the convertibility of gold into dollars can be continued for a while as the two 
curves shift upward continually with real income growth. 
Eventually, all the monetary gold will move into industrial uses, and the 
relative price of  gold will begin to rise with the demand. But will the gold 
stocks run out smoothly or be suddenly attacked? The answer lies in Salant 
and Henderson (1978), who show that speculators will attack the remaining 
gold stock at exactly the moment that they expect to earn the real rate of return 
on the appreciation of the relative price of gold while not generating a discon- 
tinuity in the relative price. At that moment, the demand curve (industrial plus 
speculative demand) shifts discontinuously upward  as in  figure 9.14. The 
14. For the operation of this concept in various gold standard and exchange rate models, see 
also Obstfeld (1986), Buiter (1987), Grilli (1990), Krugman and Rotemberg (1990), and Buiter 
and Grilli (1989). 
15. For a full discussion about why the spread between liquid and less liquid claims rises, see 
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speculators will then gradually sell their hoard to satisfy the growing demands 
for gold. The monetary gold stock evaporates. Simultaneously, however, the 
policy to stabilize the price level causes a discontinuous increase in liquid 
dollar claims to offset the loss of gold reserves, shifting the origin 0' right- 
ward as in figure 9.14. Thus, the uncontrollability of  the private demand for 
and the supply of gold, linked to an antideflationary policy, eventually elimi- 
nates gold from the list of liquid dollar claims. 
9.2.4  Devaluation 
The steady rise in liquid dollar claims in the face of constant or diminishing 
U.S.  official gold holding framed the notion of the conjdenceproblem. It was 
thought that a small gold cover might inevitably generate a run on gold. The 
liquidity problem was then only one of the horns of the Triffin dilemma-its 
solution might lead to a run on the system (see Triffin  1978, 2). 
Alternatively, in the presence of expanded demand for reserves, the dollar 
could have been devalued, as the French wanted, an action that would have 
been taken under a gold exchange standard under extreme duress.I6 In figure 
9.11, the demand for real liquid dollar claims has shifted upward to [LIP]', 
potentially leading to a deflation-that  is, to a fall in the price level from P* 
to P**. In figure 9.15, I depict the effect of a sudden devaluation in the face 
of this demand shift. A devaluation of proper magnitude would raise Pg  to Pi 
without a change in the price level from P* and reduce the gold value of liquid 
dollar claims, thereby shifting the origin 0' leftward to 0".  The rise in the 
gold price, however, raises the relative price of  gold and pushes gold from 
private uses into monetary reserves, increasing monetary reserves by A'IA'. A 
devaluation of  sufficient magnitude can maintain  a stable price level even 
though the gold value of liquid dollar claims is reduced. The fraction of gold 
to liquid dollar claims increases. 
9.2.5  The Revelation of the Dollar Standard 
The collapse of the dollar convertibility of gold exposed the monetary sys- 
tem as a dollar standard with foreign central banks responsible for maintaining 
fixed exchange rates. While the United States would still sell gold in official 
transactions, little gold was actually sold by  the United States on net  after 
1968; and the promise crumbled when it was tested in 1971. 
Thus, we move from the problem of a speculative attack on a gold standard 
to the more straightforward problem of  a speculative attack on a fixed ex- 
change rate system. A fixed exchange rate system might be quite stable, of 
course, provided  that  the authorities give high priority to its maintenance. 
16. See Rueff and Hirsch (1965, 5-6).  Solomon (1982, 55-57)  describes internal French de- 
17. A devaluation would reward those countries that held mostly gold for their official reserves 
bates on the desirability of devaluation. 
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Fig. 9.15  A dollar devaluation maintains the price level 
Given the amounts of dollar claims that other countries absorbed in their offi- 
cial reserves in the two attacks on the system in 197  1 and 1973, foreign mon- 
etary authorities obviously attached great value to the preservation of the sys- 
tem. Nevertheless, there was a limit to how much they would absorb. 
Given this limit and the increases in the growth rate of U.S. domestic credit 
indicated in figure 9.8, it was inevitable that eventually there would be a spec- 
ulative selling attack on foreign currencies.'* After the first attack in the third 
quarter of  1971, the growth rate of the U.S. money stock receded. Within a 
year after the Smithsonian realignments, the growth rate jumped yet again, 
triggering the selling attack that finally ended the system in March 1973. 
9.3  Conclusion 
By the early 1960s, analysts had pinpointed structural problems in the Bret- 
ton Woods system. One of these-the  attempt to place a ceiling on the relative 
price of gold-indeed  had the potential to terminate the convertibility of gold 
into the  dollar at official rates in private  markets. This potential  problem 
would bind if private demand for gold grew faster than new supply, the classic 
18. Grilli (1986) provides the technical framework  to determine  the timing and magnitude  of a 
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problem of  internal drain of a gold standard. In  the event, however, it was 
ironically the French passion for gold that evicted gold from the monetary 
system. Nevertheless, the  strongly and correctly perceived conclusion that 
liquid dollar claims held by foreigners relative to monetary gold would inevi- 
tably grow did not prove to be the deal breaker for the fixed exchange rate 
system. After 1968, the system was, as it was before 1968, fundamentally a 
dollar standard, with little chance that foreign official claimants would ever 
get their hands on the remaining U.S. gold stock. Yet  foreign monetary au- 
thorities valued the system to the extent of  absorbing up  to $70 billion in 
dollar claims, most of which was subject to exchange risk, to defend it. They 
had to go to these lengths because the inflationary policy of the U.S. admin- 
istration made a speculative attack inevitable. If  the administration had been 
committed to less inflationary monetary policies, the basic Bretton Woods 
system would have remained intact. In the end, Bretton Woods succumbed to 
the very policies that the Europeans had unjustifiably attributed to the United 
States in the mid- 1960s. 
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Comment  Willem H. Buiter 
I enjoyed this paper very much. It blends historical narrative and informal but 
informed  tests of  the theoretical  models of speculative attacks on fixed ex- 
change rate regimes. Garber has of course made important contributions to 
this literature, which was initiated  by  Salant and Henderson  (1978) and by 
Krugman (1979). His joint work with Bob Flood (Flood and Garber 1983, 
1984a, 1984b,  1989), together with the original  contribution  by  Krugman 
(1979), Obstfeld’s analysis of  the possibility of multiple equilibria (Obstfeld 
1986), and the elegant resolution of the “gold standard paradox” by Krugman 
and Rotemberg (1990), greatly advanced our theoretical understanding of the 
nature and causes of  rational speculative attacks. 
From a technical point of  view, any commodity-based  monetary standard, 
whether  domestic or international, is a limiting case of  a commodity  price 
Willem H. Buiter is professor of economics at Yale University. 486  Peter M. Garber 
stabilization scheme. The same holds, subject to one important qualification, 
for any fixed (or, indeed, any managed) exchange rate regime. Thus, the pre- 
World War I gold standard, the interwar gold exchange standard, the Bretton 
Woods gold-dollar standard, and its successor the dollar-U.S.  monetary re- 
straint standard can all be studied as examples of commodity price stabiliza- 
tion or buffer stock schemes. 
An ideal-type two-sided.  commodity stabilization scheme consists of an in- 
tervention authority (or a set of  intervention authorities, acting anywhere on 
the spectrum from cooperatively to noncooperatively) that aims to keep the 
price of the commodity between preannounced upper and lower limits, p" and 
p",  respectively. The instrument is interventions by the authority whenever the 
price threatens to rise above the upper limit or to fall below the lower limit. 
The simplest case is where interventions occur at the two margins or bounda- 
ries only. Inframarginal interventions modify the analysis somewhat but, for 
our purposes, not in essential ways. Let X denote the excess demand for the 
commodity, excluding any sales or purchases by the authority; XA  denotes the 
excess demand (net purchases, which can of  course be negative) by  the au- 
thority. With interventions at the boundaries only, the authority stands ready 
to act as a residual buyer of the commodity whenever (a)  p = pL,  (b) there is 
excess supply of the commodity (X < 0) at the lower intervention price, and 
(c) its reserves SA (its buffer stock of  the commodity) do not exceed some 
upper threshold sA.  Similarly, the authority stands ready to act as the residual 
seller of the commodity whenever (n)  p = p", (b) there is excess demand for 
the commodity (X > 0) at the upper intervention price, and (c) its stock of 
reserves SA  does not fall below some lower threshold SA.  Schematically, for as 
long as the stabilization scheme survives (i.e., for as long as sA 5  SA 5  sA), 
equation (1) is in effect: 
XA = 0, 
XA = min[O,  -x], 
pL  <  p  <  p", 
(1)  XA = max[O,  -XI, p = pL, 
p  = pu. 
The gold standard, the gold exchange standard, the gold-dollar standard, 
and more recent fixed exchange rate systems are examples of commodity price 
stabilization schemes for which the upper and lower support prices are very 
close together. Formal analysis is indeed often simplified by  looking at the 
limiting case where p"  = p" and X =  -XA as long as sA 5  SA 5  sA.  Target 
zones systems such as the exchange rate arrangements of the European Mon- 
etary System (EMS) are examples of commodity price stabilization schemes 
with a wider band between floor and ceiling prices. 
Ignoring physical depreciation of the commodity, the behavior of the buffer 
stock is governed by 487  The Collapse of  the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 
What determines these upper and lower thresholds for the stock of reserves? 
First, when gold is the intervention and buffer stock commodity, there is a 
self-evident lower limit below  which the holdings of  gold by  the authority 
cannot fall. For a solvent authority capable of credible commitments and fac- 
ing international financial markets characterized by  perfect capital mobility, 
this lower limit is given by its ability to borrow gold. With solvency, credibil- 
ity,  and perfect capital mobility, that limit is the entire stock of  gold in the 
system. Without solvency, credibility, or perfect capital mobility (the last of 
these will of  course not be independent of  the first two), the lower limit ZA 
could be zero, some positive number, or, if the authority has limited borrow- 
ing powers, some negative number. In a system with fiat or fiduciary reserves, 
a key issue for the viability of the stabilization scheme is what determines the 
limits on the ability of the authority to borrow reserves. 
Elsewhere (Buiter 1986, 1987, 1989) I have argued that, for a government 
that is solvent and capable of  making credible binding commitments, there 
should be no bound on the ability to borrow reserves. Given credibility (or 
willingness to pay when there is ability to pay), a reserve crisis is therefore 
always a fiscal or solvency crisis in disguise. For there to be a reserve crisis 
that is not also a solvency crisis, there must be doubt about the credibility of a 
government's commitment not to repudiate (formally or de facto, i.e., through 
a devaluation or fiscal sleight of  hand) the liabilities that it would incur in 
exchange for an increase in borrowed reserves (as with a swap). In what fol- 
lows, I maintain the assumption that there is some finite lower bound on the 
stock of reserves. 
The upper limit SA  on the amount of the commodity that the authority can 
hold may reflect limits to physical storage capacity in the case of a physical 
commodity (witness the butter mountains and wine lakes of the common ag- 
ricultural policy [CAP] of the European Community). Alternatively (or in ad- 
dition), there is likely to be a financial opportunity cost to holding the com- 
modity. In the case of  gold and a strict gold standard with pu = p" (give or 
take a couple of gold points), non-interest-bearing gold is rate-of-return dom- 
inated by  riskless assets denominated in the currencies of  the participating 
gold standard countries as long as these assets have positive nominal returns. 
Only the possibility of one or more participating countries going off the gold 
standard could cause gold not to be dominated as a store of value by  fixed 
nominal market value, positive nominal interest rate assets denominated in 
any participating currency. Even then, gold would be dominated as a store of 
value by fixed nominal market value, positive nominal interest rate assets de- 
nominated in the currency of  any continuing gold standard participant. By 
adversely affecting solvency, positive financial opportunity costs would pro- 
vide an upper limit on the size of official buffer stocks (again witness the butter 
mountains and wine lakes of the CAP). 
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(SA 5  SA 5  sA),  the intervention rule given in (1) applies. When either limit is 
breached, the commodity price stabilization scheme collapses. The literature 
on collapsing fixed exchange rate regimes is full of  alternative successor ar- 
rangements. The simplest scheme assumes that intervention ceases forever: a 
free float of indefinite duration commences. Formally, 
If  S;  5  sA  or S; 1  SA,  then X;qCi = 0 for all i 2  0. 
Richer, more interesting, and more realistic postcollapse scenarios can and 
have been thought of and analyzed. Krugman and Rotemberg (1990) analyze 
a continuous time version of the model sketched here with an interesting twist 
on the postcollapse scenario. Collapse and the abandonment of  intervention 
that it entails are not forever. Consider the case where the price breaches the 
upper bound pu  because reserves have fallen below 5”.  Intervention ceases as 
long as p  remains above p”. If  and when the price again comes down and 
enters the old target zone, the authority stands ready to resume purchases of 
the commodity when it reaches the lower bound p” of the reinvigorated target 
zone. The likelihood and timing of  a collapse (and the magnitude of the spec- 
ulative attack that triggers the collapse) will of  course be functions of  the 
(expected) postcollapse behavior of the authority. 
(3)  X, s  S,,, + C,  -  (Q, + S,), 
where S,  is the stock held at the beginning oft, excluding the holdings of the 
authority; C, is consumption demand for the commodity; and Q, is the current 
production of  the commodity. Consider the following simple model of  de- 
mand and supply found in Muth (1961): 
The excess demand for the commodity can be written as follows: 
(4)  c,=  -PP,  +  $9  P > 0, 
(5)  Q,= w,  + uIp,  y > 0, 
(6) 
All influences on consumption, investment, and inventory demand other than 
those operating through current and anticipated future prices are lumped to- 
gether in the three random disturbances uc, up,  and u’, which for simplicity 
can be taken to be zero mean i.i.d.  random variates. No special attention is 
paid, for reasons of  space, to the fact that gold is an extractive commodity 
with its own peculiar production technology. In the case of the gold exchange 
standard, inventory demand would include purchases and sales by  monetary 
authorities other than those of the United States: Jacques Rueff and Charles de 
Gaulle are buried in u’. 
The historical record of commodity stabilization schemes is one of uniform 
failure and unmitigated disaster. The gold standard was  probably the most 
successful commodity stabilization scheme ever, and even it bit the dust. 
There are good theoretical reasons for the failure of buffer stock schemes, 
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all of which can be found in the classic paper by Townsend (1977) (see also 
Salant and Henderson 1978; Salant 1983; and Buiter 1989). For a wide class 
of exogenous stochastic processes (u’, uc and uQ in our baby model) driving 
the fundamentals, and for a wide class of  postcollapse scenarios, the com- 
modity stabilization scheme will with certainty (almost surely, for those who 
crave  precision)  fail  in jinife time.  Boldly  put,  commodity  stabilization 
schemes are bound to fail. Therefore, the gold standard, the gold exchange 
standard, and the gold-dollar standard were bound to fail, and, indeed, any 
fixed exchange rate scheme short of full monetary unification is bound to fail. 
This pessimistic conclusion emerges in the absence of speculative bubbles 
and with rational expectations by all market participants engaged in intertem- 
poral speculation (those whose behavior is governed by the inventory accu- 
mulation function given in eq. [6]).  It does not require the perverse behavior 
of French or other politicians with memories and delusions of imperial gran- 
deur. The proposition is driven by  the same laws of probability that cause a 
gambler’s ruin: any finite stock of reserves will eventually be exhausted by the 
cumulative effect of even small exogenous shocks to the nonspeculative com- 
ponents of  demand (u“  and/or uQ; we do not need  u?.  Similarly, any finite 
upper reserve threshold will eventually be exceeded. 
The only way out of this box is for the authority to control directly, or to 
offset directly, the nonspeculative sources of  demand (consumption and pro- 
duction) and the speculative demands by noise traders. Strictly enforced pro- 
duction and consumption quotas, or some similar mechanism, are required. 
Killing off  all private inventory demand or speculative demand, even if fea- 
sible, would not do the job. Rational speculation will merely bring forward 
the date of the collapse through a speculative attack that depletes the remain- 
ing stock of  reserves or causes reserves to burst through the ceiling. Even 
without the help of rational speculators, a “natural” collapse will eventually 
occur through the cumulative effect of  exogenous production and consump- 
tion shocks. 
Nobody should therefore be surprised at the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
gold-dollar standard, of the earlier versions of the gold standard and gold ex- 
change standard, and of subsequent fixed exchange rate schemes (other than 
those that lead reasonably swiftly to monetary unification). 
What may be surprising is that any nation or group of nations whose mon- 
etary and  financial leadership had the unique opportunity in  1944 of  con- 
sciously designing  an  international monetary  system  from  scratch would 
mortgage its monetary and fiscal policies to the frivolous irrelevancy of  the 
running and survival of a two-tiered commodity price stabilization scheme, in 
which the non-U.S. participants fixed the dollar prices of their own currencies 
using dollar reserves (and to a lesser extent gold reserves) as buffer stocks and 
the United States fixed the dollar price of gold using gold as a buffer stock. 
Even if  the conclusions and reasoning of Townsend’s (1977) article were not 
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arrangement. Lest I be accused of ahistorical philistinism, I am happy to grant 
that the hysteretic hand of  history can explain the survival of  many quaint 
customs, habits, folk ways, myths, institutions, and modes of behavior. Bret- 
ton Woods, however, is part of the modem era, and it is hard to understand 
why, given the immediately preceding major historical discontinuities in most 
dimensions of social, political, and economic life, the international monetary 
standard continued to be tied to a not very interesting metal. The only expla- 
nation that I can think of is that the central bankers and international financial 
officials involved in setting up the Bretton Woods system were then (as now) 
among the world’s more conservative and less imaginative denizens. They 
grasped instinctively for a system with which they were familiar, that was not 
directly and obviously associated with the economic disasters of the interwar 
period, and that had survived for a considerable period of time. This inertia 
smothered the more rational designs offered by Keynes and others. 
Garber argues, quite convincingly, that the key forces driving the collapse 
of Bretton Woods and the attempts to forestall it can be conveniently captured 
by the speculative attack framework, that is, by something like the little model 
given above. Most of  the defensive measures took the form of  attempts to 
lower sA  or to control those components of inventory accumulation or specu- 
lative behavior representing the behavior of the foreign monetary authorities. 
After  1972, or,  as Garber argues convincingly, after  1968, the gold-dollar 
standard, with the United States as the manager of the gold buffer stock and 
the rest of the participants managing their dollar buffer stocks, was replaced 
de facto by  a fixed exchange rate regime based on the dollar as the reserve 
asset (the dollar-U.S.  monetary restraint standard). The buffer stock manage- 
ment role passed to  a new  decentralized authority, the foreign (non-U.S.) 
monetary authorities, who collectively (if not in coordination) managed the 
dollar buffer stock in order to fix the price of the dollar. 
The collapse of the fixed exchange rate dollar standard between 1971 and 
1973 occurred as the result of  a speculative buying attack on the foreign cur- 
rencies. Under the dollar standard, there was of  course no physical storage 
capacity limit on the ability of  the foreign authorities to accumulate dollar 
reserves. It was the opportunity cost, broadly defined, of  holding these re- 
serves that killed the fixed exchange rate dollar standard. This opportunity 
cost was not primarily the rate of  interest received on the dollar reserves, 
which was not all that much below the best available alternative. The expected 
capital loss in the event of a collapse may have had some influence on the 
willingness to continue accumulating dollar reserves. With several foreign 
monetary authorities individually capable of  abandoning the dollar standard 
(and thereby increasing the pressure on the remaining members), the dollar 
standard looked increasingly fragile. French resentment at what was viewed 
as the continued American extraction of international seigniorage added to the 
pressure. Unwillingness or reluctance to import U.S. inflation rates may have 
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What about the possibility of controlling directly the analogues of C and Q 
in the case of the dollar standard? There are effectively two approaches. The 
first starts from the balance of payments identity expressing the inflow of re- 
serves as the sum of  the capital account and current account surpluses. The 
authority attempts to control directly the various components of the balance of 
payments. Capital controls were of  course still the norm during the Bretton 
Woods era. Full convertibility (since 1959) applied only to current account 
transactions. Countries in balance of payments difficulties routinely tightened 
capital controls (both regulatory and fiscal). Even resorting to restrictions on 
current account transactions was in fact not an uncommon occurrence. 
Looking at the flow  of  reserves from the  side of  the monetary  identity 
(money = domestic credit plus international reserves), the analogue of  Q - 
C from the point of view of the foreign monetary authorities is the excess of 
their own domestic credit expansion (DCE) over DCE in the United States 
minus the excess of  the growth in demand for their own money (at a fixed 
exchange rate) over the growth in the demand for U.S. dollars. The only for- 
eign instrument in that  equation is the foreign monetary authorities’ own 
DCE. With imperfect capital mobility, the non-U.S. authorities did face a re- 
serve problem (this would not have been the case in a world with perfect 
capital mobility). They would therefore have to assign their DCE policy to the 
defense of the fixed parity. Earmarking DCE in this way will imply an even- 
tual loss of control over the stock of public debt. (This will be true even if a 
policy of continuously balancing the budget is pursued [see Buiter 19891.) To 
control the stock of reserves and the stock of public debt, the primary (nonin- 
terest) public-sector deficit will have to be managed to offset the cumulative 
effect of shocks to relative money demands. 
This loss of monetary and fiscal freedom to act implied by any policy aimed 
at controlling effectively the “nonspeculative” components of relative money 
demand (let alone to offset speculative actions of noise traders and other irra- 
tional speculators) is a high price to pay, for stabilization, allocative, and/or 
distributional reasons. The gold standard survived as long as it did because 
few if any demands were put on monetary policy other than the defense of the 
gold standard. Fiscal policy as we know it today simply did not exist: fiscal 
stabilization policy had not been invented; redistributive policies were but a 
twinkling in the eyes of the social reformers of  the day; the financing of the 
very limited public goods was constrained by a balanced budget norm whose 
only  exceptions  were  wartime  expenditures.  When  Bretton  Woods  came 
along, the demands made by monetary and fiscal stabilization policy, redistri- 
bution, the financing of public goods, and Pigovian interventions soon made 
the claims of the fixed exchange rate regime seem excessive. The predictable 
and predicted collapse occurred rather swiftly. 
After the collapse of the gold-dollar standard, the world moved to what may 
be called a “dollar-U.S.  monetary restraint” standard. The degree of private 
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the mechanism for larger and swifter speculative attacks, although it still fell 
far short of the textbook perfect capital mobility case. While, in principle, the 
United States could have been provided through swaps with unbounded re- 
serves of convertible currencies such as the deutsche mark and the pound ster- 
ling, the French frank and the yen, the foreign monetary authorities clearly 
balked at this idea, although they were willing to absorb up to $70 billion in 
dollar claims between 1968 and the final collapse of the system. Private mar- 
ket participants were likewise reluctant to assume ever-growing open dollar 
positions and exposure to exchange risk. 
Garber rightly points to the fact that the stock of official U.S. dollar liabili- 
ties that could in principle be mobilized to attack the dollar included domestic 
U. S. holdings of base money and other dollar-denominated official liabilities 
as well as the foreign holdings of short-term dollar claims on which attention 
was focused at the time. Presumably, U.S.  speculators at the time were not 
impervious to the perception of exchange risk. 
In principle, also, new outside reserves such as the SDR could have been 
created continuously in just the right amount to satisfy the growing world 
demand for real money balances at a stable world price level without relying 
on U.S. financial intermediation and the perceived portfolio imbalance (grow- 
ing long-term assets matched by growing short-term external liabilities) that 
this entailed. 
A rational speculative attack reflects speculators’ perception of  the likely 
future behavior of  the proximate fundamentals, relative rates  of  domestic 
credit expansion corrected for growth in relative money demands at the fixed 
exchange rate. These proximate monetary fundamentals are in turn functions 
of the underlying fiscal strategies pursued by the reserve country and the other 
major players. As it became steadily more apparent that U.S. policymakers 
were increasingly reluctant to exercise the monetary-fiscal restraint required 
for the long-term survival of  the dollar-U.S.  monetary restraint standard, it 
was only a matter of time until a reasonable approximation to the textbook 
speculative attack  finished off  the exchange rate  arrangements of  Bretton 
Woods. 
The period over which the exchange rate arrangements of  Bretton Woods 
survived was the only one since World War I during which the U.S. authorities 
were willing to grant international considerations priority over perceived do- 
mestic demands on monetary and fiscal policy. Ever since, the external value 
of the dollar has been seen and treated by  U.S. policymakers as the ultimate 
residual in economic policy design. This may well have made sense from a 
U.S. national perspective, given the relative closedness to international trade 
of the U.S. economy and the large weight of the U.S. monetary and financial 
sector in the global financial system. It was, however, inconsistent with the 
survival of a fixed exchange rate regime with the U.S. dollar as the reserve 
currency. 493  The Collapse of  the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System 
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General Discussion 
Fred Bergsten, Paul Krugman, and Robert Solomon took issue with the paper 
for focusing on the liquidity and confidence problems. Bergsten argued that 
the key problem of  Bretton Woods was adjustment. Although the Triffin di- 
lemma was a problem, the true factor precipitating  the collapse of  Bretton 
Woods was that the United States finally decided that it wanted to adjust-it 
wanted to strengthen its economy by reducing the trade imbalance. It was also 
felt that adjustment would head off  growing protectionist pressure. The U.S. 
monetary authorities perceived that the Bretton Woods system precluded them 
from adjusting by  devaluing the dollar,  leaving only the option of breaking 
with gold. The authorities used the dollar overhang, threats of runs, and Brit- 
ish requests for a gold value guarantee as excuses. Paul Krugman argued that 494  Peter M. Garber 
speculative attack models should be viewed only as parables that may be rel- 
evant for the recent experiences of capital flight in Latin America. These mod- 
els,  he  stated,  are not  useful  for  the  analysis of  the  collapse of  Bretton 
Woods-which  was driven by the adjustment problem, not liquidity issues. 
Peter Garber replied that he did not view the adjustment problem and spec- 
ulative attacks as inconsistent. The adjustment problem just means that there 
are many things to finance, including the fixed exchange rate. What leads to a 
speculative attack is that there is a limit on the amount of financing that the 
monetary authority is willing to use to maintain the fixed exchange rate sys- 
tem. Maurice Obstfeld pointed out that, in principle, there need not be a con- 
fidence problem, even if the outstanding stock of dollar liabilities grows very 
large relative to the U.S. monetary gold stock. A gold standard could operate 
on a very slim reserve as long as there is a limit on the amount of  fiduciary 
money issued by the center country. He argued that, if the other G10 countries 
wanted to stage a run on the U.S. monetary gold stock, they could easily do 
so by borrowing reserves abroad and just buying gold. So where the critical 
threshold occurs in speculative attack models is not clear. 
Alexander Swoboda disagreed with Dale Henderson’s remark that the Gold 
Pool arrangement can be viewed as a commitment by the other major coun- 
tries to share the burden of supplying gold to the rest of the world. The Gold 
Pool was only a temporary commitment because ultimately the members of 
the Gold Pool could correct outstanding dollar liabilities and recoup the gold 
sold. Bennett McCallum argued that the formation of  the Gold Pool was an 
indication that the United States was unwilling to let its price level be dictated 
by the commitment to the $35.00 fixed price of gold. 